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 1 
SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis has been to analyze the case of Google Spain v. AEDP, 
and the legal impacts of that particular case. One of the most important 
outcomes of the case was the establishment of the principle of the right to be 
forgotten. The definition of the principle of the right to be forgotten is to grant 
a data subject the right to have his or her personal information deleted and 
thus, making it inaccessible to a third-party. For a long time, there was a 
widespread uncertainty about the possibility of this. Because while you 
enable the protection of integrity for the data subject and protection of his or 
her personal data by removing content on the internet, you undoubtedly 
restrict a third-party from imparting information and the public to receive 
information. The core of the conflict is the clash between two fundamental 
rights in the Charter; namely the right to private life and protection of personal 
data versus the right to freedom of expression and information.  
 
This conflict was seen in the case of Google Spain v. AEDP, where the 
Spanish citizen Mario Gonzalez requested Google to delist a news publication 
about him from their search engines. The Court ruled against Google and 
stated that there indeed existed a right to have your personal information 
deleted if certain requirements were fulfilled. In addition, the Court 
emphasized that the full and complete protection of the Data Protection 
Directive meant that there should be a broad interpretation of the territorial 
scope as well as the material definitions in the Directive. However, as the 
thesis concludes, many of the questions were answered rather insufficiently. 
Thus, leaving us with inconclusive arguments and unresolved conflicts. The 
thesis delves into these gray zones as well as circumstances that are entirely 
exempted from the principle.  
 
Lastly, the thesis analyzes what impact the principle might have within the 
legal framework of the coming General Data Protection Regulation. The 
conclusion is that the provision containing the principle will further 
strengthen and reinforce the rights of the data subjects while at the same time 
consolidating the right to freedom of expression. 
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SAMMANFATTNING 
Syftet med den här uppsatsen har varit att analysera rättsfallet Google Spain 
v. AEDP, och dess rättsliga inverkan. En av de viktigaste konsekvenserna från 
rättsfallet är upprättandet av principen rätten att bli bortglömd (på engelska: 
the right to be forgotten). Principen innebär att en personuppgiftsregistrerad 
ska ha rätten att få dennes personuppgifter raderade så att en tredjepart inte 
längre kan nå personuppgifterna. Under lång tid har det funnits en vidsträckt 
osäkerhet om möjligheten till denna princip. Anledningen är att skyddandet 
av en personuppgiftsregistrerads dataintegritet samtidigt kan hindra en 
tredjepart att dela med sig av informationen och för allmänheten att få tillgång 
till denna. Kärnan i konflikten ligger alltså mellan de två fundamentala 
rättigheterna i EU-stadgan; rätten till ett privatliv och skyddet av 
personuppgifter för individen gentemot rätten till yttrandefrihet och 
informationsfrihet.  
 
Konflikten visade sig i rättsfallet Google Spain v. AEDP där den spanska 
medborgaren Mario Gonzalez begärde Google att ta bort en 
nyhetspublikation om honom från Googles sökmotorer. EU-domstolen 
dömde till Googles nackdel och slog fast att det finns en rätt att få sina 
personuppgifter raderade om särskilda rekvisit hade uppfyllts. Dessutom 
betonade EU-domstolen att ett fullgott skydd för de 
personuppgiftsregistrerade i Dataskyddsdirektivet innebär att de territoriella- 
och materiella definitionerna måste tolkas brett. Som framgår av uppsatsens 
slutsats lämnade dock EU-domstolen otillfredsställande svar till många av de 
ställda frågorna. Detta har vidare lett till gråzoner och olösta konflikter. 
Uppsatsen ämnar att fördjupa sig i några av dessa gråzoner såväl som 
situationer där principen om rätten att bli bortglömd är helt undantagen.  
 
Slutligen ska uppsatsen analysera vilken/vilka rättsliga konsekvenser som 
principen möjligtvis kommer att ha inom den kommande 
”Dataskyddsförordningen”. Slutsatsen är att principen kommer att fortsätta 
att stärka dataskyddet för personuppgiftsregistrerade samtidigt som den 
kommer att upprätthålla rätten till yttrandefrihet och informationsfrihet. 
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PREFACE 
There is a particular moment when you feel that slight shift of change, that 
sudden realization that your scholarly years might just be coming to their end. 
For some people, that realization comes at the very end. Maybe at the day 
they finally hand over their thesis, or perhaps it is the day they defend their 
thesis with brilliant arguments and wordplay. They pat themselves on the 
back and look back with pride on what they have accomplished throughout 
the year.  
 
For me it came at the very beginning, making this thesis a long journey full 
of procrastination and inhumane efforts to actually get words on paper. Never 
has it been more important to clean the room, make sure I ate properly and 
worked out regularly. But even then, rare moments of productivity prevailed, 
words actually appeared on paper and in the end: it finally got done. 
 
However, this thesis would not have been made possible without the help of 
some critical people. Therefore I want to give my utmost gratitude to:  
 
My thesis advisor Marco Claudio Corradi for taking time off his busy 
schedule to provide me with advice on this thesis. Björn, for his unrelenting 
support and fantastic proofreading skills. I am forever grateful for your 
feedback. My family, for being there and seeing it through with me until the 
end. Being able to come home once in a while to recharge my batteries really 
meant a lot. 
 
Most of all I want to thank my fantastic girlfriend Elizabeth for encouraging 
and supporting me till the very end. Without you, the lonesome journey of 
writing an essay would have been lonelier still. 
 
Five years of law school have finally come to its end and now it is time to 
pursue new exciting projects. 
 
       Norrköping, 30 december 2017 
              Kenny Chung 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
CFREU Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union 
Convention 108 Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data 
DPD   Data Protection Directive 
EC   European Community 
ECHR European Convention of Human 
Rights 
ECtHR   European Court of Human Rights 
EU   European Union 
GDPR   General Data Protection Regulation 
Google Spain v. AEPD Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja 
González 
Member States Member States of the European 
Union 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
TEU Treaty European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 
The Court   European Court of Justice 
The Directive Directive 95/46/EC 
The Guidelines The Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Ever since the birth of the Internet, our perception of receiving and imparting 
information has been revolutionized. Regardless of whether you upload 
photos on Facebook, share news articles on Twitter or simply message using 
WhatsApp; the amount of information growing at an ever-steady rate is 
unprecedented. With this comes the fact that you naturally leave a digital 
footprint every time you go on the internet, and unlike the human mind, the 
memory of the Internet is limitless. Thus, everything you ever do has the 
chance of being stored and recorded somewhere in the realm of the cyber 
world. For the average person, there might lie a comfort in knowing that the 
option to delete embarrassing photos or hastily written messages exists.  
 
However, the fundamental question changes whenever a third party decides 
to share the personal information about you. Suddenly, your digital footprint 
is imprinted upon you and the rules for deleting that information changes. 
Here, lies a clash between two fundamental rights: the right to a private life 
and protection of personal data versus the right to freedom of expression and 
information. The removal of personal data from the internet means that 
another person’s right to receive and publish that information gets restricted. 
The Google Spain v. AEDP ruling provided some clarity about the extent of 
the right to be forgotten. However, there are many issues still unresolved, and 
the challenges they pose will be present with the coming GDPR as well. 
 
In our digital age, data protection rules will have an increasingly prominent 
role to play. While many people have welcomed a more precise position for 
the principle of the right to be forgotten that the case provided, countless other 
people have voiced concern of a stronger censorship being imposed and of 
history being rewritten, changing our perception of reality. 
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1.2 Purpose and research questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to research the legal impacts on the data 
protection legal framework arising from the court case Google Spain v AEPD. 
Furthermore, I will provide clarification to how the coming GDPR might be 
interpreted in reference to the featured court case.  
 
The following questions will be answered: 
 
• What legal impacts did the court case C 131/12 Google Spain v. AEDP 
have on data protection in regards to existing data protection rules and 
fundamental rights? 
• Which legal circumstances are exempted or lie outside the scope of 
the principle of the right to be forgotten based on the judgment of 
Google Spain v. AEPD?  
• How will the new General Data Protection Regulation, with the basis 
of the court case and of the principle of the right to be forgotten, 
impact future data protection regulation? 
1.3 Method and material 
The research in this thesis is going to be conducted according to dogmatic 
legal methods. In this thesis, I plan to focus on EU legislation, case law, 
preambles, law commentaries, guidelines, preparatory work, legal articles, 
legal doctrine and general legal principles. The material above, will be used 
to understand how the legislation concerning data protection and, in 
particular, the principle of the “right to be forgotten” are applied to the 
European Union and the Member States.  
 
A big challenge with writing about data protection and data privacy is its fast 
developing nature. The legislation concerning data protection and data 
privacy is very contemporary compared to that in other legal areas. Therefore, 
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some of the materials in this thesis will be written articles, blog posts, and 
other relevant news sources to understand the current legal standpoint better. 
 
Within the area of the principle of the right to be forgotten, the case named 
Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), Mario Costeja González is the current precedent. Therefore, a 
comprehensive part of the thesis will be used to describe the case as well as 
critically examine the legal outcome and consequences with the judgment. 
Furthermore, the case in question will be analyzed through the lens of both 
Directive 95/46/EC, the Charter, and the GDPR. In some cases, there will also 
be mention of articles as well as court cases stemming from the ECHR. The 
close relationship between the Charter and the ECHR is shown in the 
following thesis, as both the Court and General Advocates often refer back to 
rulings made in the ECtHR. Furthermore, according to the explanations to the 
Charter the articles of 7, 8 and 11 (the articles most relevant for this thesis), 
correspond to their equivalent provisions in the ECHR.1 As such, some case-
law and articles from the ECHR will be necessary to analyze in order to make 
a well-reasoned legal thesis. The relationship between the Charter and the 
ECHR will be further elaborated on in the main text. 
 
Lastly, for the reader to understand the underlying legal mechanisms of 
current data protection legislation I have provided an overview of the 
development of data protection legislation.  
 
1.4 Delimitations 
There are a lot of overlapping legal topics within the area of data protection. 
In order not to deviate from this thesis’s focus on data protection and data 
privacy, those other legal topics have been chosen only out of necessity to 
understand the focus of this thesis. For example, the articles of 7, 8 and 11 in 
the Charter have their equivalence in the ECHR. These equivalent provisions 
                                                 
1 Explanations relating to the charter of fundamental rights [2007], OJ C303/02, Article 8 
and Article 9. 
 8 
in the ECHR will only be briefly mentioned when needed to put perspective 
on the focus at hand. Furthermore, only such articles within Directive 
95/46/EC and GDPR that have relevance to the principle and the case of 
Google Spain v. AEDP will be elaborated. The attention will mainly lie on 
Chapter II in Directive 95/46/EC and Chapter II and Chapter III in GDPR. 
This means that the case of Google Spain v. AEDP will be analysed from an 
EU perspective only. While the case, in question, is based on EU law as well 
as Spanish law, the thesis will only elaborate on the issues concerned with 
EU law. Furthermore, it is important to note that the principle of the right to 
be forgotten as well as the doctrine surrounding it differs a lot from U.S 
legislation. However, neither U.S legislation, nor U.S case law will be 
elaborated upon in this thesis. 
 
Lastly, the thesis is written for an audience that already has a basic 
understanding of the fundamental workings and institutions in the EU. 
Therefore, the thesis will not delve deeper into these topics. 
 
1.5 Research position 
The ruling of Google Spain v. AEPD in 2014 established a precedent on the 
data subject’s right to delete their personal data called: The right to be 
forgotten. Within the area of data protection and data privacy, the principle is 
one of the most widely discussed topics, with articles, blog posts, and research 
papers being written about it. The outcome of the aforementioned case 
brought forth an array of public requests that had Google and other search 
engines delist personal information of individuals from their search engine 
indexes. However, in the aftermath of the case, there were still some 
unresolved issues.2 Furthermore, the General Data Protection Regulation that 
will enter into force in May 2018 will consolidate the principle into law. It is 
still to be seen if that will clarify or further complicate the position of data 
erasure. Research papers, articles and blog posts within Europe as well as 
                                                 
2 See 3.5. 
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abroad in the USA, which analyses and explains the topic at hand, are 
therefore essential contributions.  
1.6 Outline 
The first part of this thesis will introduce the different legal frameworks that 
have been in place concerning data protection and data privacy. The second 
part of this thesis will present the Court case of Google Spain v. AEDP with 
a particular focus on the principle of the right to be forgotten. To understand 
the logic and arguments behind the rulings, first, the Opinion of the Advocate 
General will be introduced followed by the actual judgment of the European 
Court of Justice, and lastly, an analysis between the different lines of 
reasoning of the aforementioned two will be provided. The third part will 
bring up topics of the consequences and remaining questions arising from the 
case as well as the instances where the principle of the right to be forgotten 
does not apply. Lastly, the thesis will bring up the upcoming EU-regulation: 
GDPR, and interpret how the relevant provisions will be implemented and 
what changes we might expect.  
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2 The History of Data Protection 
and Data Privacy 
2.1 Introduction 
The fast-paced development of society’s use of data and information created 
the need of a new legislative framework governing the data protection and 
transmission within the EU. The introduction of the Lisbon Treaty brought a 
new narrative to data protection and the rules governing it. For example, 
Article 16 TFEU states a right for citizens of the EU to have their personal 
information protected with the European Parliament and the Council laying 
down rules that ensure the aforementioned data protection.3 Article 39 TEU 
have a similar wording but concerns data processing of personal information 
by the Member States while dealing with foreign affairs.4  
 
Meanwhile, certain data protection features have been established in the EU 
Charter and hence been given fundamental right status. Article 8 of the EU 
Charter concerns the protection of personal data for each individual within 
the EU.5 The Article has been described as an innovative fundamental right 
as it introduces the protection of personal data as a fundamental right 
recognized within the EU. The usage of the phrase “personal data” differs 
from the previous international instruments and goes beyond the scope 
granted in the ECHR.6 For example, whereas Article 8 in the ECHR acts as a 
right that protects personal data within the definition of the right to private 
life, Article 8 in the EU Charter concerning the protection of personal data is 
its own Article separated from Article 7, which depicts the right to private 
life. 7  While the Charter, otherwise, remains taciturn about the scope of 
                                                 
3 Article 16 TFEU. 
4 Orla Lynskey, The foundations of EU data protection law (1st edn, Oxford 2015), at 18f. 
5 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 
326/02, Article 8.  
6 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 205 ff. 
7 See Article 7 and 8 in the Charter, Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal 
Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 205 ff. 
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definition in its Article 8, according to the commentaries and explanations of 
said article, it draws inspiration from: The Directive, Article 39 TEU as well 
as Article 8 of the ECHR.8  
 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that insofar as the rights of the Charter 
correspond to the rights of ECHR the meaning and scope should be the 
same. In essence, this means that there should not be any gaps between the 
interpretation and meaning of the articles in the Charter and the articles in 
the ECHR.9   
 
2.2 The OECD-guidelines and Convention 
108 
In 1980, the OECD came out with standard guidelines for data privacy and 
data protection. The legal framework got the official name: the Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter 
referred to as the Guidelines).10The aim was to harmonize how data flow 
could cross borders, and also a response to the many emerging national laws 
on data protection data privacy (in Sweden, Germany, and France amongst 
others). The reasons being to reduce the legal obstacles and barriers to 
transborder data flow that might occur from different national legal 
frameworks.11 The Guidelines contained the following objectives: 
 
“(i) to achieve the acceptance of certain minimum standards of protection of personal 
privacy; 
(ii) to reduce the differences between relevant domestic rules and practices in the Member 
States; 
                                                 
8 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2006), at 90ff and Explanations relating to 
the charter of fundamental rights [2007], OJ C303/02, Article 8 – Protection of personal 
data. 
9 Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
10 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 75. 
11 Orla Lynskey, The foundations of EU data protection law (1st edn, Oxford 2015), at 47. 
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(iii) to avoid undue interference with flows of personal data between Member countries; 
and (iv) to eliminate, to the extent possible, reasons which might induce the Member States 
to restrict transborder data flows”12 
 
However, the Guidelines were not legally binding and the effectiveness was 
therefore limited.13 Regardless, the Guidelines provided the beginning to a 
new legal framework of concerning data protection and data privacy. 
According to the Guidelines the data processing of countries would be 
subjected to eight principles in particular: the collection limitation principle, 
the data quality principle, the purpose specification principle, the use 
limitation principle, the security safeguards principle, the openness principle, 
the individual participation principle and the accountability principle.14 In 
this context, it should be mentioned that the aforementioned principles have 
been implemented into the current legal framework of the Directive and the 
GDPR as well.15 
 
Meanwhile, a debate had started within the Council of Europe on whether 
Article 8 in the ECHR and the right to privacy gave an adequate protection 
towards the new use of modern scientific and technological methods.16 The 
debate concluded in two recommendations adopted by the Council of 
Europe’s Committee of Ministers:  
1) “Recommendation 73 (22) on the protection of the privacy of 
individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector.”17 
2) “Recommendation 74 (29) on the protection of the privacy of 
individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the public sector.”18 
                                                 
12 OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, Article 25, and Orla Lynskey, The foundations of EU data protection law 
(1st edn, Oxford 2015), at 47f. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Articles 7-14 of the Guidelines, and Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of 
Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 80. 
15 See Article 6 in the Directive, and Article 5 GDPR. 
16 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 83. 
17 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 85. 
18 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 86. 
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Furthermore, a thorough investigation of the Member States’ advancement 
within the area of data protection in regards to their national legislation was 
conducted.19 A project group named, The Committee of Experts on Data 
Protection (later renamed the Project group on Data Protection) started 
working on the Convention. This project was later known as Convention 
108.20  Convention 108 ensured data protection to be implemented into a 
legally binding international instrument. In addition, it linked data protection 
and data privacy to the right of privacy as stated in Article 8 ECHR.21  
 
2.3 Data Protection Directive 
As earlier mentioned, the importance of legislation concerning data protection 
and privacy started to gain recognition around Europe in the 1980s. The many 
Member States had already begun drafting their laws about data privacy and 
protection. 22  To avoid conflict between national laws across Europe, it 
became an inevitable topic for the EC as well. In the EC, debates and 
discussions regarding data protection were held in parallel to the 
developments happening within the OECD and the ECHR. The European 
Parliament adopted several resolutions within this period, but stressed the fact 
that there needed to be a directive from the Commission covering the entire 
EU.23 
 
In 1990, the first key steps toward a directive from the Commission finally 
took place. Even though Convention 108 was already implemented, the 
Commission noted that the disparities between the Member States concerning 
data policies had not been reduced. The Commission feared that this could 
                                                 
19 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 86ff. 
20 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 86ff. 
21 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 88-89. 
22 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 119ff. 
23 Ibid. 
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hinder the free flow of information between countries and thus, endanger the 
integration of the EC. 24  Nonetheless, the coming Directive would have 
similarities with the objectives of both Convention 108 and the OECD 
Guidelines.25 
 
The two main objectives of the Directive would aim to: “[…]protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their 
right to privacy”26 and prohibiting the restrictions to “[…]the free flow of 
personal data between Member States[…].” 27  These objectives serve 
different purposes. Art. 1(1) aims to protect every person’s right to privacy, 
which bears similarities to Article 8 in the ECHR and Convention 108 about 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.28 Meanwhile, Article 1(2) 
concerning the free flow of personal data bears similarities to Convention 108 
and the OECD Guidelines about establishing the internal market. This 
objective is more in conformity with the principles of the EU on free 
movement.29  
 
However, as the nature of directives implies, the Articles within the Directive 
are only goals that the EU aims to achieve. How the Member States decide to 
implement them in their laws can differ widely. Furthermore, it explicitly 
states that the Member States can restrict the rights and obligations set out in 
the Directive should it be necessary to safeguard specific interests.30 
                                                 
24 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 125. 
25 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 156. 
26 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 1(1) 
27 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 1(2) 
28 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 133f. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 13. 
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3 Google Spain v. AEDP 
3.1 Introduction 
With the advancement of technology, individuals, companies, and 
organizations store more personal information online. There is no escape 
from the fact that you, as a user, constantly leave your digital footprints on 
the web. The stigmatizing effects of past crimes, embarrassing incidents, and 
past mistakes are recorded for all to see. As will be shown in this thesis, there 
are legal frameworks and legal precedents that protect rights and freedoms 
related to personal data. For example, the data subject has a right to, in certain 
instances, delete their personal data from the internet. The main questions, 
however, are how far this right extends and how useful its legal properties are 
in attaining this goal. While I argue that there need to be possibilities to delete 
your personal information from the web, an unlimited right to do so would 
cause censorship and infringe upon rights such as freedom of expression.31  
 
As mentioned above, the current primary regulation governing data protection 
is the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. The Directive ordains that each 
Member State passes down national legislation deriving from the 
requirements stated therein and the paragraphs dictate when personal data 
may be processed.32 While there are no explicit paragraphs that indicates that 
a data subject has the right to delete their personal information, it is however 
implied in specific paragraphs.33 The Directive gives data subjects a right to 
access their data and if appropriate “[…] rectification, erasure or blocking of 
data […] which does not comply with the provisions.”34 Thus, there are ways 
in the existing Directive to delete personal information about yourself, and 
non-compliant companies may be judicially liable for overstepping 
                                                 
31 Article 11 Charter and Article 10 ECHR. 
32 Michael L. Rustad; Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten to 
Enable Transatlantic Data Flow (2015), 28 Harv. J. L. & Tech, at 359, Directive 95/46/EC. 
33 With the case of Google v. AEDP, the right to be forgotten became established fact. See 
further below. 
34 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 12 (c) 
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boundaries on the subject of processing of personal data.35 The deletion of 
personal information is especially relevant should the personal data be 
inaccurate or incomplete.36 
 
The following case Google Spain v. AEPD is an often-cited case regarding 
this principle and data subjects’ right to have their personal information 
deleted.37  
3.2 Background 
On the 5th of March 2010, the Spanish resident Mario Costeja González 
lodged a complaint through the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(hereafter AEPD) about articles published by the newspaper company La 
Vanguardia Ediciones SL (hereafter La Vanguardia). The published articles 
were about a real-estate auction related to attachment proceedings concerning 
González’s recovery of social security debts.38 In addition, González lodged 
a parallel complaint against Google Spain and Google Inc. for the fact that 
internet users were able to find the articles on Google’s search engine by 
merely entering his name. 39  González requested that the newspaper La 
Vanguardia would remove or modify the articles so that a third party could 
no longer see his personal information. Furthermore, he requested that Google 
Spain or Google Inc. should be required to remove or hide personal data about 
him when entering his name in their search engine relating to the articles 
published by La Vanguardia.40 
 
As the case progressed, the first complaint lodged against La Vanguardia was 
dropped as the publication of González’s personal information was legally 
                                                 
35 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 23 and Michael L. Rustad; Sanna Kulevska, 
Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow (2015), 28 
Harv. J. L. & Tech, at 361. 
36 Directive 95/47/EC, Article 12 (b). 
37 In regards to this thesis’s theme, hereinafter only deletion will be addressed within 
Article 12 (b) in the Directive. 
38 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 14. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 15. 
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justified. The second complaint against Google Spain and Google Inc., 
however, proceeded and was brought before the Court.41 
 
The questions asked to the Court were the following: 
1) In regards to Article 4(1) of the Directive, how are the definition of 
establishment and “use of equipment […] situated on the territory of 
the said Member State”42 supposed to be interpreted?43 
2) In regards to Article 2 of the Directive, is Google processing personal 
data within the scope of the Directive and if so, is Google to be 
considered a data controller for personal data? If that is the case, is it 
possible to directly impose Google to delete personal information 
from its indexes even if personal data lawfully has been published by 
a third party? 
3) In regards to the principle of the right to be forgotten, is it possible for 
the data subject with the basis of Article 12(b) and Article 14 (a) of 
the Directive to delete information about himself even if a third party 
has lawfully published it?44 
 
In short, the first question concerned the territorial scope of the Directive. 
The second question was about the material scope of the Directive and the 
last question was in reference to the principle of the right to be forgotten. 
 
3.3 The Opinion of the Advocate General 
1.)  The Advocate General began by stating that at the time the Directive was 
written, the considerations regarding the internet and online services were 
not considered. Therefore, the wording seems to be inconsistent and hard 
                                                 
41 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 16-17. 
42 Article 4 (1) (c) Directive 95/46/EC. 
43 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 20 (1) a-b.  
44 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 20. 
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to apply to the present circumstances.45 In this case, a literal interpretation 
of Article 4 (1) would exclude the application of Article 4 (1) (c) as 
Google has several establishments within the Member States. Moreover, 
the geographical location of the processing of personal information in 
regards to EU citizens by Google’s EU subsidiaries is not made available 
to the public. 46  With this line of reasoning, the Advocate General 
proposes that the Court should take an approach related to the business 
model of search engines regarding matters of territorial applicability. In 
short, the national advertising that is done through Google’s subsidiaries 
should be defined as an establishment within the meaning of Article 4 (1) 
(a). 47  The Advocate General further marks that the branch, as an 
economic operator must be considered a single unit. This single unit, 
however, still processes personal data within the context of a controller’s 
establishment, if the subsidiary acts as a referencing service provider for 
the advertising market in the Member State.48 The facts remain the same, 
regardless of whether the processing operations are situated in the 
Member States or in third countries.49  
 
In summary, all subsidiaries that act as referencing service provider to the 
advertising markets (within the EU) that Google is in charge of are to be 
considered establishments that are processing personal data within the 
context of a controller’s establishment. 50  As such, the national web 
domains of Google such as google.se, google.es, google.fi are to adopt the 
                                                 
45 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 61. 
46 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para 61-62. 
47 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 64. 
48 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 66-67. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 4(1)(a). 
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provisions in the Directive pursuant to the national regulations in that 
Member State.51  
 
2.)  On the second question, the Advocate General states that it seems quite 
clear that Google is indeed processing personal information. In short, this 
is due to Google requesting copies of web pages to be sent to Google that 
will be analyzed and indexed by Google’s search engine function.52 In the 
information that Google receives, there might be elements of personal 
data, which in turn, qualifies Google for processing personal data.53 
 
However, the Advocate General reaches another conclusion on the 
question if Google is to be considered a controller as defined in the 
Directive. The Advocate General begins by writing that in theory; the 
concept of the controller could be stretched to an absurd extent. Strictly 
speaking, even ordinary internet users of the search engine could, in 
certain circumstances, be considered controllers of this personal 
information.54 Thus, he applies the rule of proportionality in establishing 
if Google, as a search engine provider, qualifies for the role of a 
controller.55  The Advocate General interprets that the function of the 
controller should also contain an element of responsibility for the 
processing of personal data. He means that there has to be an awareness 
on Google’s part that the processed personal information is indeed 
personal information and that there exists an intention in processing said 
                                                 
51 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 4 (1) (a). 
52 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 73.  
53 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 72. 
54 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para 81 and Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
“Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines”, page 14 footnote 17. 
55 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para.79. 
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personal data.56 To exemplify this, he points to the substantive provisions 
in Article 6 – 8 of the Directive, which he interprets as requiring the 
controller to be aware of the purpose of processing personal data.57  
 
Hence, a search engine provider such as Google fails the requirements for 
being a controller. Google, the Advocate General argues, merely acts as a 
passive intermediary between the actual information provider and the 
internet user. The Advocate General also mentions the preamble where it 
is stated that the controller of messages in telecommunication or 
electronic mail is also the originator of the same messages.58 Lastly, he 
makes an analogy to the exceptions of liability in the e-commerce 
Directive 2000/31, which concludes facts concludes that Google must not 
be liable for their activity.59 In conclusion, the Advocate General follows 
the same line of reasoning as the Working Party, and states that the role 
of a search engine provider that Google has undertaken is not enough to 
be considered a controller.60 
 
2. In the third question, regarding if Article 12 (b) and Article 14 (a) of the 
Directive constitutes the principle right to be forgotten, the General 
Advocate makes a literal interpretation of the Directive and examines both 
of the Articles separately.61 The Advocate General first examines Article 
12 (b) and notes that the Article gives a right to erasure in particular when 
the presented personal information is incorrect or inaccurate.62 Neither the 
                                                 
56 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 82. 
57 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 83. 
58 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital (47) 
59 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 85, 87 and 89. 
60 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues 
related to search engines, page 14. 
61 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para.104. 
62 Ibid. 
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web pages from which the personal information originated nor Google’s 
index has any such data, and thus he draws the conclusion that the 
personal information cannot be erased on these grounds.63  Regarding 
Article 14 (a) of the Directive, the Advocate General notes that the data 
subject has to lodge a justified objection before the objection will be 
heeded. In other words, a balancing exercise between the data subject’s 
interests and the controller and third parties’ interests has to be 
conducted.64  Since the legal ground for data processing relies on the 
legitimate interest of the controller, as stated in Article 6(f), the Advocate 
General notes that the data subject’s subjective preference does not alone 
amount to an overriding legitimate interest that would constitute a 
justified objection. 65  Conclusively, the General Advocate states that 
Article 12 (b) and 14 (a) does not provide for a right to be forgotten.66 
 
However, he continues by stating that said articles has to be read in the 
light of the relevant articles in the Charter, namely Article 7, Article 8, 
Article 11 and Article 16. By making comparisons, to both the ECHR as 
well as case-law from both the Court and the ECtHR, the Advocate 
General balances the right to private life against the right to freedom of 
expression.67  In the end, he concludes that the internet search engine 
provider’s right to freedom of expression should be given priority over 
the data subject’s right to private life. 68  According to the Advocate 
                                                 
63 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 105. 
64 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 106-108. 
65 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 108. 
66 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 111. 
67 Article 7 and 11 Charter, Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 128. 
68 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 136-137. 
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General, being able to search for information using search engines should 
be considered one of the most critical ways of exercising one’s right to 
freedom of expression and information. 69  Furthermore, the personal 
information only appears when the internet user types in the data subject’s 
full name in the search engine and, thus exercises his right.70  
 
Lastly, he urges the Court not to conduct the balancing exercise of 
aforementioned conflicting interests on a case-by-case basis. To make a 
case-by-case assessment would, he argues, both give the internet search 
engine providers an unmanageable amount of requests from internet users 
and also move the decision-making process to the search engine 
providers. These factors would ultimately lead to inadequate legal 
protection for the data subjects.71  
3.4 The Judgment 
1) Regarding the first question, about the territorial scope of the Directive, 
the Court answered that although Google Search was handled by Google 
Inc., Google Spain was still considered a subsidiary to Google Inc. In 
addition to that, Google Spain has a separate legal personality through its 
promotion and advertising activity. Thus, it would be viewed as an 
establishment within the definition given in Article 4 (1)(a) in the 
Directive.72  
 
Furthermore, the Court pointed out the fact that the processing of personal 
data did not need to be carried out by the establishment but simply carried 
out in the context of the activities of the establishment according to Article 
                                                 
69 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 131.  
70 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 130. 
71 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 25 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen, para. 133-134.  
72 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 46-49. 
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4 (1) (a).73By operating through an establishment in a Member State 
intended to profit in the advertising market, the connection between the 
controller and the establishment is enough to make the Directive 
applicable for Google. 74  Lastly, the Court stressed the fact that the 
Directive’s purpose is the protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of all individuals. Hence, the definition of the territorial scope 
in the Directive is meant to be interpreted broadly. 75  The broad 
interpretation is, in particular, essential for a controller residing in a third 
country, as that circumstance, should not stand in the way of ensuring 
natural persons their rights and freedoms.76  
 
2) Regarding the second question, the material scope of the Directive, the 
Court began by defining the interpretation of processing of personal data 
as stated in Article 2 (b) of the Directive. In its role as an operator of a 
search engine, Google manages several functions such as retrieving, 
recording, organizing, collecting and storing personal data. Thus, Google 
is to be regarded as a processor of personal data.77 This fact remains, 
regardless of the fact that other websites may have published the data, in 
which Google only acts as the intermediary.78 Hence, the Court answered 
affirmatively on the question of whether Google would be considered a 
controller within the definition in the Directive. The reasoning was that 
Google, as a search engine operator, decides its own purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data it indexes. 79  Furthermore, the 
undertaking done by the search engine providers, in general, further 
                                                 
73 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 52. 
74 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 55-56. 
75 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital (18-20) and Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 53-54. 
76 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital (20). 
77 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 28-29. 
78Ibid. 
79 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2(d) and Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 32-33. 
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disseminates the already published information by websites.80 Since the 
activity by the search engine providers makes the information ubiquitous 
and facilitates access for internet users, the search engine providers have 
to comply with the Directive to ensure a full data protection for the data 
subjects.81 To have search engine providers excluded from the definition 
of controller would go against the objective and the provisions of the 
Directive.82 
 
The Court continued by raising the question regarding whether Google 
needed to delete information from its indexes even though a third party 
lawfully published it. Article 12 (b) of the Directive gives every data 
subject a right to delete information about himself or herself, if the data 
does not comply with the Directive. 83  The Court described the legal 
ground for processing the personal information of González to be 7 (f), 
where a balancing of rights and interests between the data subject and 
controller is required.84 The Court went on to state that any internet user 
would have access to the personal information of Gonzalez by merely 
typing in his name. By indexing the personal information, Google greatly 
facilitated the accessibility of said personal information and made it 
ubiquitous.85 The Court found that the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of Gonzalez, especially in regards to his privacy, were considered more 
important than the economic interests of Google and the public in 
attaining that information about Gonzalez. 86  The importance of the 
Directive being able to ensure an efficient and complete protection of 
individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms was emphasized once again 
                                                 
80 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 36. 
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Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 34, 38. 
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Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 34. 
83 Directive 95/46/EC, Article 12 (b).  
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Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 73-74. 
85 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 80. 
86 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 81. 
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as being central to the Directive. The fact that the publisher was not 
residing within the EU did not matter.87  
 
3) The third question was about the extent of which data subjects may have 
their information deleted. In this case, the newspaper lawfully published 
Mr. Gonzalez’s personal information, which Google later listed in their 
search engine. The Court had to answer the question if deletion of 
personal data was generally to be considered lawful for the reasons that 
the data subject may face prejudice.88 One of the main points that the 
Court brought up was, whether the personal information could be deleted, 
if the processing did not comply with the Directive as stated in Article 
12(b).89 The Court argued that not only inaccurate information could be 
erased but also personal information that was inadequate, irrelevant or 
excessive as stated in Article 6 (1) (c) to (e).90 
 
Furthermore, as previously stated, the legality of the processing has to be 
supported by Article 7 in the Directive. The processing of personal 
information as done by Google is legitimized on the legal ground stated 
in Article 7(f) in the Directive. Hence, the balance of interests between 
the data subject, and the public (including the controller and the third 
party) has to be weighed against each other. In this particular case, the 
publication had taken place 16 years earlier, and the sensitivity of the 
personal information at hand (attachment proceedings for the recovery of 
social security debts) was deemed more important than the economic 
interests of Google and the public’s right to attain that information.91 The 
judgment was a combination of aforementioned factors of being 
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irrelevant/inadequate, and infringing on the private life of the data subject. 
The conclusion being that Gonzalez’s personal information should be 
deleted from Google’s search engines regardless of whether it caused the 
data subject prejudice.92  
 
However, the Court also stressed the fact that a more public figure may 
have had a different outcome as the public may have had a more 
justified reason to access the information about said public figure.93 
3.5 Analysis of the Opinion of the General 
Advocate and the Judgement  
The opinion of the Advocate General and the ruling from the Court has many 
dissenting points between the recommendations of the former and the actual 
turnout. In the following, I will address those different lines of reasoning.  
 
In reference to the first question, both the Advocate General and the Court 
agrees that Google Spain counts as a subsidiary to Google Inc. with a legal 
personality. The act of promoting and selling advertising space in a national 
market is enough to amount to being a controller processing personal data in 
the context of the activities of the establishment.  
 
In the second question, the Advocate General and the Court agree inasmuch, 
that Google in its role as a search engine provider does handle the activity of 
processing personal information. However, the Advocate General and the 
Court disagree in regards to whether Google should be considered a controller 
in its role as a search engine provider. The Advocate General mentions that 
the search engine’s sole purpose is to replicate and reproduce personal 
information from the original provider, thus, only allocating information to 
be more accessible. Ultimately, Google leaves the content unaltered. Herein, 
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the General Advocate claims the rule of proportionality and therefore 
excludes search engines as being controllers. This view is not shared by the 
Court, which states that the search engine provider is indeed processing 
personal data and with that deciding by itself the purposes and means of that 
very data. 94 Furthermore, the objective of the Directive is to protect natural 
people’s right to privacy concerning the processing of their data.95 By this 
line of reasoning, the Court instead makes a teleological approach that 
prioritizes the complete protection of the data subjects. 
 
As far as my thesis goes, the Court’s approach is the correct one. Although 
the rule of proportionality ought to be implemented, setting the threshold of 
inclusion too low would make the Directive ineffective in its objective to 
protect the affected data subjects. This consideration is particularly important 
when considering that search engines are a significant part of how internet 
users navigate the web as well as how they find and receive information.  
 
Furthermore, there are two inconsistencies brought up by the Advocate 
General that are worth mentioning. The Advocate General states that the 
Directive was drafted in a way that would cover new developments. In the 
same paragraph, however, he mentions that following a teleological and 
literal approach of the Directive would not be optimal as the emergence of 
the internet was a new phenomenon. It might be true that the phenomenon of 
the internet was unforeseen but from my standpoint, the argument does not 
suffice to limit the scope of interpretation of the Directive. The nature of the 
Directive (and legal frameworks in general) is to be applied within an area of 
constant new developments. Thus, the Directive would have had, as the 
Advocate General himself mentioned, to take on possible future 
developments regardless of the extent of them.  
 
                                                 
94 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 33. Compare 
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The Advocate General also makes a comparison of how making a search 
engine provider take upon the responsibilities of a controller would equal to 
making an internet user, owning an electronic device, a controller as well. 
According to him, processing the personal data in a random manner should 
not fall within the definition of a controller that determines the purposes and 
means of said information. The same way that an internet user should not be 
considered a controller simply for downloading a case-file from the internet 
containing personal information.96  
 
In this context, it is important to note that the Directive aims to ensure an 
efficient and complete protection to data subjects.97 If an internet-user or a 
company is, processing personal information related to the data subjects they 
should not be exempted from the responsibility of that of a controller unless 
it is mentioned in the Directive.98 Naturally, as mentioned, there ought to be 
a reasonable threshold for the application of the Directive. Therefore, it is 
important to highlight the influence that a search engine provider have. Not 
only do search engine providers manage an enormous amount of data but they 
also facilitate data access for internet-users around the world. Neither an 
internet user nor a third-party news-publishing website could never manage 
information in the same manner. That being the case, when we consider the 
difference in capacity between search engine providers and internet users, the 
comparison the Advocate General makes between the two aforementioned of 
potentially being controllers, is really underestimating the influence of search 
engine providers.99 Exempting search engine providers from the Directive 
would make it a lot less effective and setting the threshold too high. 
 
                                                 
96 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
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With that said, the Court does not comment on the rule of proportionality 
whatsoever in its judgment. In my opinion, this seems a bit lacking as the 
Advocate General correctly points out that the Court has chosen the rule of 
proportionality over the literal and maximalist approach in prior cases.100 The 
omitted explanation concerning the application of the rule of proportionality, 
unfortunately, leaves the legal status regarding the scope of the definition of 
controllers unknown. Giant search engine providers, such as Google, are 
considerably easy to recognize and enforce responsibility on for complying 
with the Directive. However, the legal status concerning other smaller 
websites that likewise replicates and reproduces information remains unclear. 
The primary question would be whether a smaller website would be equally 
responsible regardless of the usage and exposure of the personal information.  
 
Following above-mentioned line of reasoning, would a personal blog, for 
example, be given the same amount of responsibility? This question was 
brought up in the case of Bodil v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping. In the case, 
Bodil Lindqvist had set up a website on her personal computer which 
contained personal information about herself and 18 other colleagues.101 The 
consent of the colleagues for publishing their personal information was not 
obtained.102 One of the questions referred to the Court, concerned whether 
Bodil Lindqvist’s processing of personal information would fall within the 
scope of Article 3(2) second indentation.103 The Article states that processing 
of personal information solely done in private or in the context of household 
activities are exempted from the Directive. 104  The Court pointed to the 
preamble and stated that the activities carried out had to be exclusively 
personal or domestic.105 Therefore, the publication on the internet that made 
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the data accessible to a broader public could not be considered to fall within 
the scope of Article 3(2) second indentation.106 In the context of personal 
blogs, publicly accessible content would infer that even smaller websites 
would fall outside the scope of Article 3(2). In spite of that, these days 
platforms like Facebook and Instagram provide the user with the option to 
restrict the accessibility to only include your friends and family. The 
following question would, therefore, be if a limited online access could be 
considered to fall within the scope of Article 3 (2)?107 
 
The last question concerned the principle of the right to be forgotten. 
Although, the Advocate General argued that there did not exist such a right, 
the Court went ahead and granted data subjects the right to erase their data 
based on Article 12 (b) and 14 (a) of the Directive. For Article 12 (b) the 
Advocate General pointed out that the erasure of the personal data, 
particularly, concerns information that is incorrect or inaccurate. By arguing 
that the information was neither incorrect or inaccurate, he concludes that 
Article 12 (b) should not grant the data subject a right to delete his or her 
data.108 However, in my opinion, this analysis is insufficient. The wording of 
the Article reads “erasure […] of data […] of which does not comply with the 
provisions of this Directive, in particular […].”109 The interpretation of the 
Article should not exclude other given circumstances in which processing of 
personal data does not comply with the Directive; even if particular attention 
should be put on personal information being inaccurate or incomplete. As the 
Court noted, the list in Article 12(b) is not exhaustive.110 In the judgment, the 
Court examined Article 6(1) (c) to (e) as well and stated that incompatibility 
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with Directive could be a result of being inadequate, irrelevant or 
excessive.111  
 
The Advocate General further discusses Article 14(a) and its requisites, 
eventually dismissing the application of Article 14(a) as granting a right to 
erase personal information.112 According to the Court, Article 14 (a) should 
be included in the same balancing act as Article 12(b) and can therefore be 
more specific in finding compelling interests for the data subject’s particular 
situation.113  
 
Apart from aforementioned factors, the Court simply states that the 
circumstances in the current case grant the data subject a right to erase his 
data as stated in Article 12 (b) and Article 14 (a). Neither the reach of Article 
12 (b), nor that of Article 14 (a), is explained further. The omission of said 
explanation, therefore, leads to my conclusion that both of the articles are 
given a broad interpretation. This interpretation is partly seen in the Court’s 
judgment where both non-compliance with Article 6 (1) (c) to (e) and non-
compliance with Article 7 (f) fits within the scope of Article 12 (b) and Article 
14 (a). 114  However, in my opinion, this still leaves questions about the 
interpretation of the articles. For example, does Article 12 (b) grant a right to 
delete personal information for all non-compliant processing, no matter how 
small? Are there situations where the data subject’s justified objection grants 
erasure in Article 14 (a) but not in Article 12 (b)?   
 
Regarding Article 7 (f), the Court and the Advocate General both discuss the 
balancing of opposing rights. 115  The Advocate General argues that the 
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public’s interest and right to receive information as established in Article 11 
in the Charter should be prioritized before the individual’s right to private life 
and data protection in Article 7 and Article 8 in the Charter. However, the 
Court states that data subject’s fundamental right to private life, as a general 
rule, overrides the economic interests of the controller and the public’s 
interest to access and receive the information. In other words, the Court’s 
conclusion was that there exists a legal presumption that the privacy of the 
data subject overrides both the controller’s and the public’s interest to receive 
information in Article 7(f) in the Directive.  
 
However, as far as my research goes, this judgment of valuing the data 
subject’s right to privacy to such extent is unprecedented in the Court’s cases. 
This case is the first one where the Court declares that there exists a general 
rule in where the fundamental rights of the data subject override the 
controller’s economic interests as well as the public’s right to impart 
information.116 The Advocate General, as a result of his reasoning, does not 
indulge in a discussion stemming from that fact but instead regards the two 
opposing fundamental rights as even.117  
 
Lastly, as explained by the Court, the articles in the Directive must be seen in 
the light of the fundamental rights.118 In addition, the Court expressed that the 
data subject’s rights as a general rule override the economic interests of the 
controller as well as the public’s right to gain access and receive the personal 
information. However, the ruling lacked an in-depth explanation on the role 
of the fundamental rights in reference to the articles in the Directive.  
Furthermore, in my opinion, the Court does not sufficiently elaborate on how 
the balance of interest between the two opposing rights should be constructed. 
This is quite problematic, because, as the Advocate General mentioned in his 
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opinion, to grant data subjects the right to erase personal information from 
search engine providers would lead to two significant results:  
1) The search engine provider would be given the obligation to manage 
deletion requests from internet users. 
2) The matter of deleting personal information would be managed 
exclusively between the data subject and the search engine provider 
thus, decentralizing the decision-making obligation to a private 
party.119 
 
By omitting a proper explanation of how the balancing should be done, the 
Court essentially leaves the decision-making about when to delist personal 
information to search engine operators, whom will have to second-guess the 
intentions of the Court. 120  It has further been argued that the lack of 
elaboration on how to balance the two fundamental rights will ultimately 
devalue the right that was less discussed; namely the legitimate interests of 
the public and the controller as stated in Article 11 of the Charter.121  
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4 After Google Spain v. AEPD 
4.1 Introduction 
After the judgment, Google launched an online form, which gave Europeans 
the possibility to remove links related to them from the search engine. 
Specific criteria such as the personal information being irrelevant and 
outdated are required in the online form.122 Following this, Google received 
requests from citizens all around Europe to have their links removed from 
Google search engines in the EU.123 However, while the links might have 
gotten removed from the search engines in the EU, the search results related 
to those search terms are still up on the U.S version of Google, and the original 
publisher’s website in question.124 
 
With aforementioned information, there remain a few questions concerning 
the conclusion of the court case of Google Spain v. AEDP. It is clear that the 
personal information in question was not removed in its entirety from the 
Internet, but merely delisted on Google’s search engines. The following 
instances still provide means for the public to access Mario González personal 
information: 
1) While the search engine operator had to remove any search results 
based on Mario González’s name, the article about Mario González 
would still be available on the publisher’s website.125 
2) As mentioned above, Google only removed the links to the personal 
information based on González’s name from the search engines in the 
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EU. It is still possible to search for the original article with González’s 
name on the U.S. version of Google.126 
 
With the exceptions mentioned above in place, it is clear that the principle of 
the right to be forgotten does not apply in all kinds of circumstances. For 
example, González’s side did not proceed with the case of having the 
publisher La Vanguardia take down the article, as it had been published upon 
the order of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to give maximum 
publicity to the auction.127 One may hypothesize what would have happened 
if the news article had not been under Spanish legislation and hence been 
required to be published.128 While the same articles in the Directive would 
have applied, it is not certain the outcome would have been the same. A daily 
newspaper and a search engine are in many ways different, and the assessment 
of the possibility to delete information has to be done in accordance.129  
 
The following pages will highlight the material differences between a news-
publishing website and a search engine by analyzing the following criteria: 
journalistic purposes, level of exposure, and the data subject’s recognition in 
public. These criteria bear particular importance, as they were mentioned by 
the Court in Google Spain v. AEDP as requisites distinguishing a search 
engine provider from a news-publishing website and thus, potentially falling 
outside the scope of the right to be forgotten.130 
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4.2 Journalistic purposes 
Article 9 states an exemption of the Directive from “[…] processing of 
personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes […].” 131  The 
applicability of the principles in the Directive, if at all, should be determined 
in a restrictive manner.132 To judge if the journalistic expression should be 
exempted, one has to weigh it against the fundamental rights of individuals 
as laid down in Article 10 ECHR.133 Because the Directive came into force 
earlier than the Charter, no referring was made to the latter but instead to the 
ECHR. However, Article 11 of the Charter states the same thing as Article 10 
in the ECHR and according to Article 52(3) of the Charter, the interpretation 
and meaning should correspond to the articles in the ECHR.134 While this 
means that processing of personal data expressed through journalistic 
purposes can be exempted from the principles in the Directive, there is a need 
to analyze the content of Article 9 as well as understand what the expression 
of processing of personal data solely for journalistic purposes means. 
 
In the preliminary ruling of Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Finland referred questions regarding the scope of journalistic practices in 
Article 9 in the Charter to the Court. The case was about Markkinapörssi, 
transferring personal data containing individuals’ tax information to the 
company Satamedia for them to disseminate the information through a text-
messaging system.135 In the case, the Court described the objective of Article 
9 in the Directive as to reconcile the fundamental rights of protection of 
privacy and freedom of expression.136 Therefore, journalistic activities must 
be interpreted broadly but not more than necessary for the protection of 
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privacy.137 The Court went on to summarise the content of Article 9 in regards 
to the processing of personal data solely for journalistic purposes like this:  
 
“[…] data from documents which are in the public domain under national legislation, may 
be classified as ‘journalistic activities’ if their object is the disclosure to the public of 
information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them. 
They are not limited to media undertakings and may be undertaken for profit-making 
purposes.”138 
 
While traditional newspapers, such as La Vanguardia, certainly falls under 
the scope, the Court also opened up for an interpretation with undertakings in 
other media, particularly referring to the internet.139 With the internet comes 
a range of different ways to express and process personal information through 
social media, blogs and internet forums, etc. Furthermore, the Court clarified 
that the definition of solely journalistic purposes did not preclude an action 
taken for profit-making purposes as that might often be the result of 
professional journalistic activity.140 
 
However, with the definition mentioned above, there is no difference between 
a news-article about American politics written in the New York Times or an 
off-handed comment on Facebook about Donald Trump’s haircut. The 
question, I hence ask, is whether the journalistic activity should have a certain 
quality to itself. This issue was further elaborated on in the Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott. As described in the Opinion, the processing of 
personal information for journalistic purposes is the act of “imparting 
information and ideas on matters of public interest.”141 The Advocate General 
further explained the type of communication and the subject-matter that must 
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be taken into consideration when deciding whether the content is of public 
interest. 142  The definition of public interest relates to public debate, and 
matters such as public hearings, the transparency of political life, the conduct 
of politicians and so on; are all matters of public interests the Advocate 
General argued. 143  Nonetheless, issues about an individual’s private life 
satisfying only certain readers in the public were not regarded as such. An 
important factor for deciding whether the content could be seen as being 
public interest or not have to do with whether the subject has legitimate 
expectations to have his or her private life respected.144  
 
The Advocate General concludes, by stating that it is not possible to ascertain 
which topics will be considered matters of public interests in advance, and 
that it is not up to the authorities to determine such issues as that could amount 
to censorship.145 With this explanation, a written article in New York Times 
would fall within the scope of Article 9 in the Directive while the latter 
comment would not. 
 
4.3 Level of exposure and public life 
In the case of Google Spain v. AEDP, the Court pointed out that personal 
information that initially had been lawfully processed might become, as time 
passes, incompatible with Article 6(1) (c) to (e) in the Directive. If that is the 
case, it would be a legitimate reason to delete one’s personal information 
pursuant to Article 12 (b) and Article 14 (a).146 These circumstances; the 
significant intrusion of his privacy and the personal information being 
published 16 years earlier were reasons enough for the data subject to have 
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his search result deleted from Google. 147  The information was just not 
considered sufficiently relevant to the public when comparing the news value 
of the personal information to the intrusion of privacy that Mario Gonzalez 
would be subjected to.148  
 
While the relevance of Gonzalez’s personal information was the same 
regardless of it being on Google or in a daily newspaper; it is important to 
note the difference in exposure between being on a third-party news-
publishing website and on international display. The assessment criteria 
undertaken for a national daily newspaper and a global search engine has to 
be different.149 According to the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen and 
the cited case Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, the Articles 7 and 8 in 
the Charter apply to any information that is related to an identifiable 
individual. 150  Therefore, by making the personal information about Mr. 
Gonzalez significantly more accessible on the search engine, the intrusion of 
his privacy was also higher.151  
 
Referring to the fundamental rights of Article 7 and Article 8 in the Charter, 
the Court stated that as a rule of thumb these fundamental rights override both 
the economic interests of Google and the public’s interest in partaking that 
information in regards to Article 11.152 However, the outcome is ultimately 
dependent on the actual personal information being processed. For example: 
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The nature of the personal information, the sensitivity of the issue for the data 
subject’s private life, and how great of an interest it is to the public to know 
about the information, all are important deciding factors.153 The last criterion 
is of particular interest as it relates to the public life of certain data subjects, 
whose privacy may consequently be allowed to be infringed to a more 
considerable extent.  
 
As the Court does not further elaborate on above-mentioned criterion, it is not 
possible to define exactly what public life the data subject must lead in order 
for the public to have access to his or her personal information.154 However, 
a few legal sources may be able to spread light on this issue. The Resolution 
1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
describes a public figure as someone holding public office and using public 
resources.155  However, the definition extends even further to people that 
merely play a role in public life. These people can partake in the economic, 
the political, and the social or any other public arena.156 If these people are 
considered to be playing a public role; information about private details of 
their lives may be of public interest. 157  In the case of von Hannover v. 
Germany (no.2), the ECtHR argued that a clear distinction had to be made 
between public figures and private individuals. ECtHR continued stating that 
the same level of protection of privacy could not be ascertained to a public 
figure contributing to the public debate or in their exercise of official 
functions.158  
 
The interesting part of unraveling the definition of public life is that it seems 
to have some relation to the description of how the expression of journalistic 
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purposes should be interpreted. 159  In essence, according to my research, 
newsworthy articles that impart information of public interest either are 
exempted from the Directive, pursuant Article 9 in the Directive, or override 
the privacy of the data subject in Article 7 (f) in the Directive. In spite of that, 
it is essential to clarify that there may be a discrepancy to how the definition 
of matters of public interest may be interpreted in Article 9 as opposed to 
Article 7(f) in the Directive as the context of assessment is different. While 
the requisites for Article 9 depend on the public outreach and specific 
qualities of the journalistic activity, Article 7(f) has to be assessed from a 
fundamental rights perspective. A published newspaper article that falls 
outside the Directive in regards to Article 9 may, on the other hand, be 
infringing on privacy in reference to Article 7(f) when instead published by a 
search engine.  
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned facts, it may still be impermissible to 
reproduce information about the data subject beyond that initial publication. 
Even if that means that it has reached the public sphere. According to the case 
of Aleksey Ovchinnikov:  
 
“In certain circumstances a restriction on reproducing information that has 
already entered the public domain may be justified, for example to prevent further 
airing of the details of an individual’s private life which do not come within the 
scope of any political or public debate on a matter of general importance”160  
 
The citation is corresponding to the earlier discussion of how debates that 
only interest a particular audience should not be regarded as matters of public 
interest.161 In the context of Google Spain v. AEPD, the reproduction of Mr. 
Gonzalez’s personal information featured on the Google search engine could 
have potentially been restricted by invoking his fundamental rights to data 
                                                 
159 See 4.2. 
160 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, Opinion of 
Advocate General Jässkinen, para 127 and Aleksey Ovchinnikov v. Russia App no. 
24061/04 (ECHR, 16 December 2010), para 50. 
161 See 4.3.1. 
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privacy. The arguments would have been that the information, displayed on 
the daily newspaper La Vanguardia, was not a matter of public interest 
beyond the initial publication. While the publication in the Spanish 
newspaper regarding Mr. Gonzalez’s attachment proceedings served a 
purpose in that they tried to gather as many bidders as possible, the interest 
of the public may have been limited to the period when the bidding was still 
on-going.162 Following this line of reasoning, there would be legitimate 
reasons not to spread his personal information beyond the initial publication. 
 
4.4 Territorial scope 
As mentioned above, Mario Costeja González’s personal information 
continues to be delisted on the search engine platforms residing within the 
EU. In addition, the accessibility for residents in the EU are restricted.163 This 
condition is prevalent regardless of which country’s Google search engine 
provider is used.164 An example of said situation, would be that an internet 
user using the Google search engine in Sweden would not be able to access 
delisted personal information on any search engine, within or outside of the 
EU.  
 
However, it has been pointed out and made evident that the personal 
information in question will still be available for an Internet user not residing 
within the EU on one of Google’s many search engines outside of the EU.165 
The same is possible if EU citizens manage to make it seem as though they 
are doing their search outside of the EU, by hiding their geographical location 
                                                 
162 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 16. 
163 Peter Fleischer, ‘Adapting our approach to the European right to be forgotten’ (Google 
blog, 4 March 2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/adapting-our-approach-to-
european-rig/ 
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid. 
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from Google (through proxy services for example).166 This situation naturally 
puts the effectiveness of the principle of the right to be forgotten into question. 
 
Some countries, among them France, have required that Google apply the 
principle of the right to be forgotten as ruled in the decision from Google 
Spain v. AEPD, not only for search engines within the EU, but also outside of 
the EU. In other words, these countries have required Google to delist the 
information on all their search engine-related platforms. As of this moment, 
the court proceedings regarding the territorial scope of the principle are still 
underway.167 The outcome of the case will most certainly affect international 
companies’ interaction with data protection within the EU.  
 
As of now, Google has requested a preliminary ruling from the Court, asking 
for clarification about the territorial scope of the delisting. The first question 
is if the delisting involves all the domain names used by Google, regardless 
of whether the search of the requester’s name is conducted outside the 
territorial scope of the Directive. If that is not the case, the second question 
delves into the issue whether the delisting should be limited to the Member 
State from which the request was made and, if so, the delisting should be 
made on all the domain names for all of the Member States bound by the 
Directive. The third question asks if the delisting should be done by blocking 
searches from IP-addresses deemed to be located within one of the Member 
States regardless of which Google domain name is used.168 
 
As the case is in the middle of its process, there is no way of knowing the 
result of the preliminary ruling. However, it may be possible to get a hint by 
analyzing the current legal standpoint. In the case of Google Spain v. AEPD, 
on the topic of whether the Directive was applicable under Article 4 (1) (a), 
                                                 
166 Alex Hern,‘Google takes right to be forgotten battle to France’s highest court’ (The 
Guardian, 19 May 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/19/google-
right-to-be-forgotten-fight-france-highest-court  
167 Ibid. 
168 Case C-507/17 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) 
lodged on 21 August 2017 — Google Inc. v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL). 
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Google argued that Google Spain was merely providing advertising support 
to Google Inc., hence not partaking in any processing activity done by Google 
Inc.169 However, among other things, the Court argued that it was not 
necessary for the actual processing to be done by the establishment itself, 
namely Google Spain. It was enough that it was done in the context of the 
processing activities by the establishment.170 Furthermore, an essential 
purpose of the Directive is the use of non-restrictive personal processing 
activity pursued by the Directive.171 The Court underlined the fact that the 
main processing activities of a company being carried out in a state outside 
the EU, should not be a factor which renders the Directive inapplicable. 
Otherwise, it would have been ineffectual and easy to circumvent.172  
 
This conclusion is shared by the Opinion of the Working Party, which states 
that there are still circumstances under which the Directive will be applicable 
even if the controller is a non-European Economic Area-based controller. 
However, the establishment of the controller has to be exercising real and 
effective actions in the processing activity in regards to the controller. 
Furthermore, these establishments can be local offices, subsidiaries with legal 
personality, etc. The requirements that the processing operations have to be 
carried out in the context of the activities of the establishment, implies that 
the actions have to have relevance to the processing activity per se. For 
example: Whether the establishment has user-relations or is involved in 
advertising to inhabitants of the Member State are two implications that the 
processing operations are in context with the activities of the establishment.173  
 
                                                 
169 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 51. 
170 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 52. 
171 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal and Others [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474 para. 62-63. 
172 Directive 95/46/EC, Recitals (19-20) and Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. 
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 53-54.  
173 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party “Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues 
related to search engines”, page 9-10. 
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These legal findings seem to point in a direction where Google will eventually 
have to universally apply the rules of the Directive to their search engines.  
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5 General Data Protection 
Regulation 
5.1 Introduction 
On the 15th of December 2015, the EU Parliament and Council agreed to the 
final version of the GDPR. The final version was later adopted, and the date 
set for enforcement is on the 25th of May 2018.174 
 
The implementation of the GDPR succeeds the Directive and is meant to be 
universally and directly applicable in the Member States.175 There are several 
new functions in the GDPR, but most importantly, the GDPR aims to 
harmonize data privacy laws within the EU, which will naturally bring 
enormous changes for companies and private citizens alike.176 The primary 
purpose of the GDPR is to continue to reinforce data protection and privacy 
for all EU citizens. Furthermore, in order to make sure that the Member States 
comply with the new regulation; administrative fines, amongst other things, 
will be introduced. These penalties could go up to 20 000 000 EUR or 4 % of 
total worldwide annual turnover for non-compliance and infringements on the 
data subject’s rights, whichever is deemed to be the highest amount.177  
 
The GDPR will also consolidate the principle of the right to be forgotten. 
While the principle was already considered controversial prior to the 
implementation of the GDPR, the consolidation of the right to be forgotten 
has drawn further criticism from practitioners and private citizens alike.178 
The criticism is multifaceted, but a great deal of concern lies in the fact that 
companies may feel forced to comply with an erasure request so as not to risk 
                                                 
174 GDPR Timeline of Events, http://www.eugdpr.org/gdpr-timeline.html  
175 Julian Wagner; Alecander Benecke, “National Legislation within the Framework of the 
GDPR” (2016), page 359. 
176 GDPR Portal: Site Overview, http://www.eugdpr.org/eugdpr.org.html  
177 Article 83 (5) (b). 
178 Daphne Keller, The new, worse ‘right to be forgotten’ (Politico, 27 January 2016), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/right-to-be-forgotten-google-defense-data-protection-
privacy/  
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being subjected to the high administrative fines. In turn, this situation would 
lead to companies erasing personal information upon request without much 
consideration and thus, result in a higher degree of unwanted censorship.179180  
In the new Article 17 GDPR, individuals will likewise be able to request that 
their data be taken down and deleted from those responsible for processing 
the data.181 The circumstances, under which the principle is applicable, are 
established in Article 17 (1) (a-f) GDPR. 
 
5.2 The Right to be Forgotten 
Article 17 Right to erasure ('right to be forgotten')182 
1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal 
data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation 
to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: 
(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were 
collected or otherwise processed; 
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point 
(a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for 
the processing; 
(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no 
overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the 
processing pursuant to Article 21(2); 
(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; 
(e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or 
Member State law to which the controller is subject; 
(f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society 
services referred to in Article 8(1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten (2011-2012), page 90. Daphne Keller, The 
new, worse ‘right to be forgotten’ (Politico, 27 January 2016), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/right-to-be-forgotten-google-defense-data-protection-
privacy/ 
180 Note that the administrative fines described in above article were based on old 
information. Nevertheless, he considered them as being ‘ruinous monetary sanctions’. 
181 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental 
Right of the EU (1st edn, Springer 2014), at 246. 
182 GDPR, Article 17. 
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5.2.1 Article 17 (1) (a) GDPR 
Article 17 (1) (a) GDPR concerns the situation when the information of the 
data subject no longer is relevant, according to the purposes for which the 
personal data originally were being processed. This situation is also 
mentioned in Article 5(b) in the Directive where the controller has to state the 
purpose of the personal data processing.183 According to the Court in Google 
v. Spain, the Directive grants the right for the data subject to have his or her 
data deleted should the personal data no longer be relevant. The right to 
erasure of personal information is applicable even if the personal information 
concerned might initially have been relevant to process.184 To ascertain the 
effectivity of data protection for the data subjects, there is a proposal from the 
European Commission to reverse the burden of proof where it will be the 
responsibility of the data controller to prove that the information is still 
relevant for the stated purposes and, thus, should not be deleted. 185 
 
5.2.2 Article 17 (1) (b) GDPR 
Article 17 (1) (b) GDPR concerns the data subject’s consent as a legal ground 
for the processing of personal data.186 While this means that the data subject 
has agreed to let the controller process his or her personal information, a 
withdrawal of the consent means that the legal ground for processing the 
personal data disappears.  Hence, the personal information has to be erased 
upon request from the data subject.187  
 
The equivalent Article of processing based on the data subject’s consent can 
be found in Article 7 (a) in the Directive. The conditions of a valid consent 
are that it has to be “[…] freely given, specific, informed and [an] 
                                                 
183 GDPR, Article 17 (1) (a), Article 5 (b). 
184 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 93-94. 
185 European Commission, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” ruling (C-131/12), 
page 3. 
186 See Article 7 (a) GDPR. 
187 Article 17 (1) (b) GDPR. 
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unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes […].”188   While the 
definition of consent seems to be mainly the same in the new Regulation as 
in the Directive, the conditions for consent in the new Regulation has been 
strengthened.189  In addition to the definition of consent above, there are 
further conditions for the data subject’s consent to be valid as stated in Article 
7 GDPR. For example, the controller should be able to prove that the consent 
has been given. 190  Furthermore, the request for consent should be 
distinguishable from other matters and presented in a clear and easily 
accessible form.191 Lastly, withdrawing one’s consent should be as easy as to 
give the consent in the first place.192 The Article has been added to prevent 
long unintelligible terms and conditions from the requesting party.193  
 
5.2.3 Article 17 (1) (c) GDPR 
Article 17 (1) (c) GDPR gives the data subject a right to object to the further 
processing of his/her personal information.194 This Article, in turn, refers to 
Article 21(1), which states that the data subject can object to processing that 
is not necessary for the legitimate interest of the controller or a third party 
based on the legal grounds of Article 6 (d) and Article 6 (f) GDPR. Article 21 
(1) has its equivalence in Article 14 (a) in the Directive which is based on the 
processing of personal data done according to the controller’s interests.195 If 
there are no overriding interests based on Article 6 (d) or Article 6 (f) GDPR, 
the processing shall cease. My interpretation is that Article 17 (1) (c) together 
with Article 21 (1) means that any initial processing, as well as further 
processing, should immediately discontinue.  
 
                                                 
188 Article 4 (11) GDPR and Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2(h). 
189 GDPR Key Changes - “Consent”, https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html. Compare 
Article 4 (11) GDPR and Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2 (h).  
190 Article 7 (1) GDPR. 
191 Article 7 (2) GDPR. 
192 Article 7 (3) GDPR. 
193 GDPR Key Changes - “Consent”, https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html. 
194 Article 17 (1) (c) GDPR.  
195 Article 21 (1) GDPR and Directive 95/46/EC Article 14 (a). Just like the previous 
Article in the Directive, the Article in GDPR refers to the legal processing grounds dealing 
with the controller’s or third party’s legitimate interests. 
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Article 17 (1) (c) also refers to Article 21 (2) which deals with situations when 
data processing is done for direct marketing purposes. Unlike Article 21 (1) 
there is no need to override a legitimate interest from the controller or a third 
party, a simple objection from the data subject is enough.196 When the data 
subject has objected to data processing pursuant to direct marketing purposes, 
such processing of personal data has to cease.197 In reference to processing 
done for direct marketing purposes, the data subject receives a particular 
reliable data protection.198   
 
5.2.4 Article 17 (d) to (f) GDPR 
Article 17 GDPR introduces a few more legal grounds on which it will be 
possible for the data subject to erase their personal data. Article 17 (d) and (e) 
GDPR both have to do with the lawfulness of the processing. If it is unlawful 
or not in compliance with Union or Member State law the data subject has a 
right to oblige the controller to the erasure of such personal data.199 Article 
17 (f) GDPR concerns the protection of privacy regarding children’s personal 
information. Where personal information regarding children has been 
collected in relation to the offer of information society services, the data 
subject, namely the child in question has a right to have it erased. As is evident 
by the preamble, a child might not be able to realize the risks of having his or 
her personal information processed.200  
 
As far as my research goes, the sole purpose of Article 17(f) seems to be to 
strengthen a child’s right of erasure. Article 17 (f) refers to Article 8 (1) that, 
in turn, makes the distinction between processing of personal data in relation 
to the offer of information society services for children over the age of 16 vis-
á-vis under the age of 16.201 In both cases, the consent is the legal ground 
upon which the processing of personal information will be made legal. 
                                                 
196 Article 21 (2) GDPR. 
197 Article 21 (3) GDPR. 
198 Compare Article 21(1) with Article 21(2). 
199 Article 17 (d) and (e) GDPR. 
200 Recital (66) GDPR.  
201 Article 8 GDPR.  
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Although, for children under the age of 16, the consent has to be given or 
authorized by the parent (holder of parental responsibility). These findings 
effectually mean that the legal ground for erasure could have been based on 
Article 17(1) (b), withdrawing consent, instead of having its legal ground in 
Article 17 (1) (f). For the situation in where a child under the age of 16 has 
given the consent and where the parents have not been consulted, this would 
constitute unlawful processing, and the legal ground of Article 17 (d) could 
be applied to said erasure of personal data. As far as my thesis goes, these 
legal findings seem to indicate the lawmakers’ intention of especially 
emphasizing the data protection of children. 
 
5.2.5 Article 17 (2) GDPR 
The intention of Article 17 (2) GDPR is to strengthen the rights of the data 
subjects to have their personal information erased.202 The section in Article 
17 (2) urges the controller, which has been requested to delete the personal 
information, to also inform other controllers to delete any replications, copies 
or links to said personal data. The obligation to do such, depends on the 
technical measures and the technology available within reason. 203  This 
Article did not previously exist in the Directive, and the lawmakers imposes 
an extended responsibility on the controller to ensure that the data subject’s 
privacy is being adequately protected. However, there are also concerns about 
the passage being redundant as Article 13 (2) (b) already urges controllers to 
inform the data subject about erasure requests.204 Nonetheless, Article 17 (2) 
seems to put the burden on the controllers to contact each other, instead of 
having the data subject needing to do the same. 
 
                                                 
202 Recital (66) GDPR. 
203 Article 17 (2) GDPR. 
204 European Digital Rights, Key aspects of the proposed General Data Regulation 
explained, page 6. 
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5.2.6 Article 17 (3) GDPR 
The last passage in the Article deals with situations that are exempted from 
the right to erasure, and which specifies the particular circumstances where 
public interest overrides the data subject’s right to erasure.205  While the 
situations listed in 17 (3) (b) to (e) states exemptions to specific cases, such 
as in the area of public health, scientific, historical, archiving and so on, the 
most compelling exemption is stated in Article 17 (3) (a). The passage in 
question, concerns exercising the right of freedom of expression and 
information. As previously noted, this fundamental right conflicted with the 
right to be forgotten. By providing a separate Article for the principle of 
freedom of expression, the lawmakers want to highlight the importance of the 
balance between data privacy and freedom of expression.  
 
Lastly, according to case law, the provisions of the Directive have to be seen 
in the light of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter.206 Although 
the GDPR has yet to be implemented, the Court has stated that the Charter 
embodies general principles of law that must be ensured.207 Therefore, there 
should not be any doubt that the GDPR will also follow the same 
interpretation as the previous Directive.  
 
5.3 Territorial Scope and Freedom of 
Expression and Information 
In addition to Article 17, there are a few Articles in the GDPR that should 
be mentioned, and which, together with the right to be forgotten fortifies the 
data subject’s complete protection.  
 
                                                 
205 European Commission, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” ruling (C-131/12), 
page 4. 
206 Case C-465/00 Österreichischer Rundfunk [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:294, para. 68. 
207 Case C-465/00 Österreichischer Rundfunk [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:294, para. 68. 
 53 
5.3.1 Article 3 GDPR – Territorial Scope 
The territorial scope of the new Regulation has been changed in order for 
there not to be any doubt as to whether the Regulation’s rules apply. If a non-
EU company or search engine offers goods or services to EU-citizens, the 
laws of the GDPR will be applicable. The rules will apply regardless of where 
the processing activity is being undertaken.208 The rewording of the Article 
seems, amongst other things, to refer to the situation that arose in the case of 
Google Spain v. AEDP.209 When determining if the controller or processor is 
offering services to data subjects in EU, there are some deciding factors 
involved including the use of language, currency, mentioning of customers or 
users in EU, which may clarify if the controller or processor has to abide by 
the Regulation.210  
 
5.3.2 Article 85 GDPR – Processing and 
freedom of expression and information 
This new Article obliges the Member States to reconcile the protection of 
personal data with the right of freedom of expression and information.211 In 
contrast to above-mentioned articles, this Article presents the Member States 
with an administrative task of implementing sufficient protection for the right 
of freedom of expression and information.212 Member States shall, therefore, 
establish national legal frameworks that specifically empower the freedom of 
expression and information, including such processing of information that is 
carried out for journalistic, artistic, academic or literary expressions.213 
 
According to the European Commission, the Article aims to reinforce the 
freedom of expression and to strike the right balance between the fundamental 
                                                 
208 Article 3 (2) GDPR, European Commission, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” 
ruling (C-131/12), page 2. 
209 Ibid.  
210 Recital (23) GDPR. 
211 Article 85 GDPR. 
212 Julian Wagner; Alexander Benecke, “National Legislation within the Framework of the 
GDPR” (2016), page 356. 
213 Article 85 GDPR. 
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opposing rights as ruled in the case Google Spain v. AEDP.214 This addition 
eliminates the uncertainty under the previous Directive where personal data 
protection could be implied to be regarded as more important than freedom 
of expression, information, and media.215 
 
 
                                                 
214 Article 3 (2) GDPR, European Commission, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” 
ruling (C-131/12), page 4. 
215 Ibid. 
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6 ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION 
In the case of Google Spain v. AEPD, the Spanish citizen Mario Costeja 
González requested Google to erase search results about him stemming from 
a newspaper publishing two articles about his attachment proceedings for the 
sake of covering social security debt. The Court assessed several different 
questions: The matter concerning the principle of a right to be forgotten, the 
responsibility of a search engine provider and the territorial scope of the Data 
Protection Directive.   
 
The core question of the case concerned the problematic balancing exercise 
between fundamental rights within the Charter. The Court responded to the 
question from a legal standpoint where it gave priority of the data subjects’ 
right to privacy and protection of personal data over the controller’s and the 
public’s legitimate interests to impart and receive information. Throughout 
the case, the objective of the Directive to ascertain a full and complete 
protection for the data subjects was emphasized. Furthermore, this reasoning 
meant that the territorial scope of the Directive included controllers, which 
were outside of the Member States, but had establishments within the 
Member States. Search engine providers such as Google, were considered to 
have the responsibilities and liabilities of a controller as defined within the 
Directive.  
 
While the judgment finally laid to rest questions about the principle of the 
right to be forgotten, there was also criticism of how the judgment lacked 
depth and only vaguely explained its assessments. For example, the territorial 
scope of the principle right to be forgotten, and its implications for different 
domain names as well as geographical locations were left untouched. These 
matters have left Google pursuing the question of whether the Directive 
would be universally applicable for the delisting of information on all their 
search engines. This issue could have been resolved, had the Court given 
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more explicit guidance. Furthermore, the balancing exercise between two 
opposing fundamental rights was only superficially explained.  
 
As the Advocate General foresaw, the aftermath of the verdict saw Google 
take on the responsibility to erase personal information from its search 
engines. With the vague explanation of how the balancing exercise should be 
conducted, Google has been given insufficient tools to handle requests for 
delisting personal information. Furthermore, because the delisting will be 
done in private it may further undermine the representation of the 
fundamental rights. The establishment of a general rule, that data subject’s 
privacy overrides the freedom of expression, might leave the latter in a 
disfavoured position, since the Court did not clearly define how to balance 
the conflicting fundamental rights. One possible outcome is that the 
precedence for individuals’ rights to private life and data protection may limit 
the right to expression and information, and in practice, further censor 
published information.  Lastly, there still exists questions regarding the extent 
of the definition of controller. While Google was ascribed the responsibilities 
and liabilities of a controller, the Court did not mention if the same would be 
applicable for other internet-based entities.  
 
Nonetheless, as explained in this paper, the principle of the right to be 
forgotten does not apply in every circumstance where processing of personal 
data is involved. There are some possibilities where the principle of the right 
to be forgotten, based on Article 12 (b) and Article 14 (a) of the Directive, 
would be exempted or overridden based on several factors. The factors 
presented in this thesis include: If the processing of personal data was 
submitted for journalistic purposes, the level of exposure and relevance that 
the information has, and lastly whether the data subject lived a public life. 
While the first one is an exception to the Directive in regards to the processing 
of personal data, the latter ones depend on the requisites in each individual 
case. 
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When it comes to the GDPR, there are no doubts that the new regulation will 
have a significant impact on data regulation procedures henceforth. The 
harmonization of the data protection regulations means that the same rules 
will bind countries within the EU. To ascertain that non-EU companies 
offering services or goods to EU citizens (e.g., Google) will have to apply the 
provisions of the GDPR; Article 3, has been rewritten. The new Article 
intends to enact certainty about the applicability of the GDPR regardless of 
the geographical area of the processing. This change is aimed to reinforce the 
effectiveness of the data protection for individuals, not least when it comes to 
the right to be forgotten. Right now, it is too early to hypothesize how the 
Court will interpret the principle of the right to be forgotten in its consolidated 
form. Nonetheless, there will be a more significant responsibility for the 
controller processing personal data, by, for example, needing to contact other 
controllers.  
 
As far as the criticism goes, not only the principle of the right to be forgotten 
will be consolidated in the GDPR, but this extends to the right to freedom of 
expression as well. In addition to that, Article 85 aims to strengthen the 
processing of personal information in different media undertakings by urging 
the Member States to establish national legal frameworks protecting the 
freedom of expression. It is yet uncertain, by what means, will these 
provisions prove the criticism unfounded by assuring companies, and 
controllers alike, from precipitously deleting data subject’s information.  
 
In summary, as has been explained in this thesis, the legal area of data 
protection is developing fast, and there will undoubtedly, be a continuation of 
the debate concerning the application of the legal frameworks and principles. 
This research paper aimed to provide an insight into the principle of the right 
to be forgotten leading up to the GDPR. However, it remains to be seen how 
the Court intends to apply and interpret the articles in the upcoming GDPR. 
Hopefully, the Court will manage to strike the right balance between the two 
opposing fundamental rights. 
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